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USE OF POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
IN ESTATE PLANNING
JOSEPH CURTIS
Definition
Whatever its nomenclature, a power of appointment may be regarded
for estate planning purposes as one to make a disposition of property, or
of rights in property, other than such property as is owned outright
and absolutely. A power to amend a trust so as to shift beneficial in-
terests therein; a discretionary power to accumulate or distribute in-
come; one to determine the respective shares of the income recipients;
or to invade corpus; are all powers of appointment, whatever they may
be designated, bringing into operation the provisions of IRC sections
2041 and 2514 in the determination of the Federal estate and gift tax
consequences that follow upon exercise, release or lapse of the power.
These Code sections have no applicability in treating upon a reserved
power, one which the settlor reserved in himself, as there are other
far more reaching sections, such as 2036 and 2038, applicable to proper-
ty subject to a reserved power. This paper will be confined to treating
upon donated powers, those given to others by a settlor of a trust, the
primary targets of sections 2041 and 2514. A further confinement will
be to treat only upon estate and gift tax consequences and not income
tax considerations. Where a power is hereafter mentioned, it should be
understood to mean only a donated and not a reserved power, and
where tax incurrence is referred to, estate and gift taxes and not income
tax is the reference.
Classification
Only general powers, as defined by the Code, without property law
refinements, generate possible tax liability to the donee-holder of the
power or to his estate. Nongeneral powers bear no tax significance and
therefore for purposes of the tax aspects of estate planning, it is neces-
sary to have only two classifications of powers, general powers and all
others, whatever other classifications may have some significance in
property law. General powers are defined by the Code as being those
exercisable in favor of the donee or his estate or the creditors of either,
2041 (b)(1), 2514(c), including where the appointive property may be
used to satisfy any tax liability of the donee or his estate. Regs. 2041-1
(c); 2514-1(c). If the appointive property can in no way be used for
the economic benefit of the donee or his estate, it is a nongeneral power,
beyond the encompassment of 2041 and 2514, nor is it reachable by
any other section of the Code solely by reason of the existence and
functioning of the power.
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Taxability
Once determined that the power is a general one within the Code
definition, the tax consequences are clear. The appointive property,
for tax purposes, is property owned absolutely by the donee. Common
law concepts, that the property remains that of the donor and passes to
the appointees or takers in default from the donor and not from the
donee, are wholly discarded in tax law. If the general power is ex-
ercisable by deed, and is so exercised by the donee, it is his gross gift
to the appointees. If it is released inter vivos, or he permits it to lapse
during his lifetime (with an exception to be noted infra), it is his gross
gift to the takers in default. And if the donee dies possessed of the
power, the appointive property is a part of his gross estate, whether or
not he exercises the power by will. It is, in all tax respects, the donee's
property to dispose of as he chooses, whether to himself, his estate,
appointees or takers in default. The same tax provisions applicable to
an absolute owner of property apply if the donee appoints in trust
retaining the income right or the right to designate who shall get the
income, or retaining the right to alter, amend or terminate, or a rever-
sionary interest, or in contemplation of death. 2041 (a) (2).
Given a nongeneral power, no matter how broad, so long as he cannot
appoint for the economic benefit of himself or his estate, there is no
such tax incurrence by the donee or his estate whether he exercises,
releases or permits the power to lapse. The common law concept, that
the appointive property passes to the appointees or takers in default
from the donor and not from the donee, continues to prevail as well
in tax law, at least since 1942.
Use of Powers in Estate Planning
Powers of appointment are not to be used in estate planning to gain
tax advantage. There is none to be gained. It should be apparent that
the tax consequences are no different (1) whether (a) one gives proper-
ty outright to his child, or (b) gives the property in trust for his child
with a general power of appointment in the child. Similarly, they are
no different (2) if (a) he gives the property in trust for his child for
life, remainder to his child's issue per stirpes, or (b) gives in trust for
his child for life with a power to appoint to such of child's issue and in
such manner and shares as child should see fit. There is a tax advantage
in either of the alternatives under (2) compared with either under (1),
but due to generation tax-skipping, not to the use of powers, which
powers obviously can be employed in (1) or (2). The advantage of
the power given in (2) (b) is to permit child to take into consideration
future events in the determination of who of his issue is to take, in
what shares and in what manner, instead of fixing the shares at father's
death without regard to circumstances as they may exist at child's
death, perhaps many decades later,
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Powers of appointment are very useful in estate planning where the
objective is the use of a power, when future interests are to be created,
to enable consideration of future events in the determination of the
ultimate disposition of the property. Once having determined that this
is desirable, then and only then should tax considerations enter into the
plan. In tax planning, the objective is to avoid creation of a power that
may needlessly incur tax cost upon its exercise, release or lapse. De-
termination of the use of a power should be made on the basis of how
desirable is the flexibility of being able to consider circumstances as
they may exist decades later in ultimately disposing of the property.
Determination of the nature of the power should be made on weighing
tax costs against perhaps overriding objectives.
It would be very rare, if not wholly nonexistent, except for the
marital deduction trust in which a general po.wer is mandatory to pre-
serve the deduction, that the objective of giving a general power of
appointment to the donee would outweigh the tax burden of doing so.
There may be a unique situation in which a settlor or testator might not
wish to give property outright to a donee, but to give him the power
to take it outright any time the donee chooses, irrespective of the tax
costs. It would be even more unique to give him only a testamentary
power to appoint the property by will to the donee's estate, knowing,
if so advised, of the additional estate tax burden that may be incurred,
whether or not the power is exercised. The objectives of a long term
trust are preservation of principal and appropriate administration, pro-
viding family resources as needed without needless dissipation, genera-
tion tax-skipping, and ultimate distribution to a class of beneficiaries, be
they children, issue, grandchildren, nephews and nieces. A general
power in the donee is a threat to all of them. A special power is no
threat to any of them and provides added flexibility. A general power
in the donee is to be avoided unless there are compelling reasons for it,
as in the case of the marital deduction trust, or in the case of where tax
consequences are to be belittled or bedamned.
Extent of Benefit and Control to be given Donee
A decision to use a nongeneral power of appointment in conjunction
with a generation tax-skipping trust must be followed by a further de-
cision as to the extent of benefit and control over the property to be
given the donee. This is wholly a matter of the settlor donor's wishes,
but he should be advised of the possibilities open to him without losing
the tax saving objective. It may be that the donor intends that donee
should have only the life income right with a power to appoint the
principal by will among the donee's children, or whatever the class of
objects of the power. On the other hand, donor may wish donee to
have as much economic benefit in and control over the property as can
be given without incurring additional tax cost to donee or his estate.
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The Code provisions allow considerable latitude in this regard, specific-
ally excluding certain rights in the donee in defining a taxable general
power. Consider the following example:
Father, F, has income producing property which he wishes to give
to his son, S, however he wants to avoid the value of the property
in either his own or S's gross estate for estate tax purposes, and also
avoid a second gift tax liability should S decide to give it to his chil-
dren in S's lifetime. F has therefore decided to transfer the property
in trust for S and S's children, giving to S as much economic benefit
in the trust property and also as broad control over the disposition
of the property as is possible without defeating the generation-skip
tax saving objective. The trust terms will provide:
1. "Annual trust income to be paid to S during S's life." No problem,
of course. The principal does not become part of S's gross estate by
reason of his life income right where he was not settlor.
2. "S to have the power by deed or by will to appoint the property to
such of his children in such manner and in such shares as he may
see fit, and in default of exercise of the power, the property to pass
per stirpes to S's issue living at his death." The power is not ex-
ercisable in any way in favor of S or his estate and therefore incurs
no tax liability whether exercised or not.
3. "S may invade corpus for any purpose whatever, but not to exceed
$5,000 or 5% of the value of the corpus whichever is greater in any
one year." Although this would otherwise be considered a general
power, section 2041 (b) (2) specifically makes an exception where
the invadable amount is so limited. The advantage is that if S should
not-invade the corpus in each year, it will not be treated as a lapse
of a general power whereby S would be making a transfer of $5,000
in each year, retaining the right to the income therefrom under sec.
2036 coupled with 2041 (a) (2).
4. "S may invade corpus in excess of $5,000 but only to meet extra-
ordinary illness costs or to the extent necessary to maintain his
ordinary standard of living and failure of other means of support."
Sec. 2041(b)(1) (A) specifically excludes this from the definition
of a general power where the right to invade is subject to an ascer-
tainable standard relating to health, education, support or mainte-
nance.
5. "S may refuse the income in any year and cause it to be added to the
trust corpus." This is not advisable in light of the tax saving ob-jective. The income is S's property and therefore each year he re-
fuses it, he would be making a transfer under 2036 in which he re-
tained the right to the income from such income added to corpus.
6. "S may terminate the trust at any time and appropriate the trust
corpus as he pleases, but (a) only with the consent of F while living,
or (b) all of S's children after F's death." (a). While sec. 2041 (b)
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(1) (C) (i) specifically provides that if the power is exercisable only
with the consent of the donor, it will not be treated as a general
power, and this therefore would be all right from the standpoint of
S's gross estate, it would result in inclusion of the property in F's
gross estate under sec. 2038. (b). 2041 (b) (1) (C) (ii) provides that
if the power is exercisable only with the consent of one having an
interest in the property substantially adverse to an exercise in, favor
of the donee, it will not be considered a general power. S's children
do have such an adverse interest and thus the (b) part would not
be objectionable from a tax standpoint.
The above trust terms, omitting 5 and 6(a), offer maximum benefit
and control in the donee without losing the generation-skip tax ad-
vantage. Of course, the powers given the donee may be greatly re-
stricted, depending upon the donor's Wishes. The above term 2 power
may be made exercisable only by will; it may be made nonexclusive and
non-illusory, where by S, if he exercises the power, must appoint a sub-
stantial amount to each of his children; it could omit "in such manner"
and provide that S must appoint the property outright to his children
and not in trust. The powers of corpus invasion could be more limited
or entirely omitted, as could the income right. These are matters for
donor's decision and do not affect taxability.
Rule Against Perpetuities
Without treating in depth on the applicability of the Rule against
Perpetuities to powers of appointment, at least one basic should be men-
tioned in any paper on the use of powers in estate planning. Most basic
of all is that the common law period of the Rule, lives in being plus 21
years and periods of gestation, commences to run from the time of cre-
ation of a power, other than a general power exercisable. by deed, and
not from the time of exercise of the power. Minot v. Paine, 120 N.E.
167 (Mass.). Violations of the Rule occur more frequently -in two
planning areas: (1) when a testator wishes to tax-skip, or for what-
ever reason wishes interests to formulate beyond more than one genera-
tion, which can be done if vesting of interests is carefully geared to
members of future generations living at his death; and (2) when a
settlor, establishing an inter vivos trust, creates interests which would
be perfectly good if done by will, but not so by deed. Both of these
planning areas are particularly susceptible to the Rule even when no
powers of appointment are to be used. Using powers, there are pitfalls.
A typical violation in (1) would be to give by will to grandchildren,
described by class, a special testamentary power of appointment, which,
because there may be afterborn grandchildren, may not become ex-
ercisable within the period of the Rule. The power is therefore void in
its creation. The same would apply to (2), one earlier generation, if the
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special testamentary power in children were to be created by deed
during the life of the donor, who could presumably have more children.
Exercise of the Power
A power of appointment is not considered to be exercised by the
donee at common law unless there is (1) specific reference to the
power, (2) specific reference to the appointive property, or (3) his
dispositions would be ineffective without including the appointive
property. In re Proestler's Will, 5 N. W. 2d 922 (Iowa). Many states
have, by statute, altered this concept in varying degrees. Va. Code
Ann. #64-67; Md. Ann. Code Alt. 93 #4-407. The more common
form of statute permits the appointive property to pass in accordance
with the residuary clause of the donee's will, unless there is an express
intent that it should not serve to exercise the power. The common law
rule requires evidence of a positive intent to exercise the power, where-
as the more usual statute requires evidence of an intent not to exercise
the power. There is much that could be said on the value of either
position. It has been by the respective legislatures which have adopted
or rejected the statutory change. Is it more likely that the donee in-
tended that all property over which he should have the power of dis-
position should pass under his will, including appointive property (the
statutory position)? Or is it more likely that the donee intended the
appointive property to pass, however it would, should he not specific-
ally exercise the power (the common law concept). Conjecture in the
realm of what may have been in the mind of a deceased donee, is
wholly unreliable, if not impossible. The donor should be apprised
of this and take it in hand, as he may. If the donor has provided for
who should take in the event that donee fails to otherwise dispose of
the appointive property, he should make the test a positive disposition
by the donee and not one by negative inference. He can and should do
this by simply providing that the power can be exercised by the donee
only by specific reference to it, thus overcoming any statutory pro-
vision to the contrary.
